The Goods in the Scholarly Marketplace

This a set of notes for my talk at Duke University this week. It draws on the Political Economy of Publishing series as well as other work I’ve been involved with by Jason Potts at RMIT amongst others. The title of the talk is “Sustainable Futures for Research Communication” and you can find the abstract at the Duke event page.

The video is now available along with the slides. The lecture capture didn’t get such a clear view of the slides so you may want to bring both up and play along.

Sustainability is the big discussion point in Research Communication. Will journal’s survive? Are APCs the only credible route to sustainability? Or will they lead to inevitable destruction of journals? Will monographs survive? Scholarly societies? What, as is asked over and over again, is the future of the library? Of the institution? This week, frankly, of the nation state?

Figure: Two responses to the same tweet. Differing views on what “sustainability” is all about.

And into this space we see perspectives from economics and political economics start to filter in. Martin Eve and David Golumbia are concerned about taking labour – and implicitly – labour theory seriously. From within the publishing industry the perspective of consultants – mostly financial analysts rather than economists – looks to trends and balance sheet calculations. Scientific Reports up, PLOS ONE down, build a story out of the data. As someone who has seen the inside those stories are almost always roughly right on the trends and almost entirely wrong on the underlying reasons for them.

Financial analysis is important but it is a weak grounding to understand Research Communications. Here I agree with Golumbia and Eve, as well as Jason Potts amongst others, that “OA advocacy” but also industry advocacy “[…]lacks robust critical grounding for its propositions in credible Marxist or socialist economic theory” or indeed in any but the most facile theories of market operation. There are sound political reasons for this. Articulating a clear dichotomy between corporatist, self-enriching encumbent players, and the selfless and public spirited intent of scholars to communicate has been an affective mean of driving the debate.

The nature of “scholarly goods”

This dichotomy is implicitly framed in economic terms. The private goods of publishers are growing at the expense of the creation of public goods by scholars. Knowledge, must surely be a public good. The Jefferson quote we often use could hardly have been shaped better to make the case for which quadrant of Ostrom’s diagram knowledge belongs in. But its also obviously more complicated than that. Jefferson fails to mention to McPherson in his letter that you need your own candle to accept his flame, or at least a taper or lamp. That you can only receive that light by being close to the candle. The flame may be non-rivalrous but it is still exclusive – there remain hurdles to gaining access.

He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.

Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Issac McPherson, “No Patents on Ideas,” 13 August 1813.

As with the candle flame, so with knowledge. The aim of Open Access is not to simply nationalise the private goods of the artist formerly known as the publisher. To convert private goods to public goods. History and economics tell us this is not a generally successful path. Our goal, and indeed I would argue that a core goal of scholarship itself, is to make the exclusive goods made within small groups of scholars more public. Since Robert Boyle railed at alchemists, the importance of communicating scholarship has been central to science, and since Plato wrote down Socrates’ complaints about the dangers of writing scholars have debated how new technology affects that communication. In that sense the idea of “public making” and the tension that immediately arises from the question of “to which publics” has always been the central issue of scholarship.

Groups make knowledge

It is easy to fall down the rabbit hole of philosophy of knowledge. So I’m not going to seek to define it here. I will however assert that private experience is not knowledge; that knowledge is a characteristic of groups. In that sense it is born exclusive, as it is held within the group. The process of public-making is both an investment – it requires effort – and a risk – it reduces exclusion. There must therefore be a process of exchange, the group receives something back in return for this public-making. The process of exchange, as knowledge is absorbed and tested and refined by other groups, creates collective (or more public-like) goods that benefit a wider range of groups. New ideas unlock problems, new tools are built that can be generally used, research is applied by others to create wider benefits.

However classical economics, in particular the work of Mancur Olson, tells us that the value of collective goods is not a sufficient incentive for their creation. In large systems it is more in the interest of contributors to try to free-load on collective goods, and in a classic tragedy of the commons, the collective good is created at a lower than optimal level, if at all. It is not at all an accident that knowledge making groups make an exclusive good. Buchannan’s work on the 60s identifies goods with these characteristics as the ones that make groups (specifically clubs providing facilities in his work) attractive to members, and therefore sustainable. We therefore have two high level questions to answer if we want to address sustainability: how to sustain the groups that make knowledge, and how to make it in their interest to invest in making their exclusive “club” goods more public-like.

Institutionalising the scholar

These may not seem like the questions that I suggested I would answer at the beginning but that is deliberate. These are the foundational questions we have to address. Olson and Buchannan as well as Elinor Ostrom offer us some solutions. Olson notes that one solution to the challenge of collective action is to make it compulsory. He is thinking of taxation systems, but the effective compulsion for professional scholars to publish provides a similar mechanism. Ostrom notes that while in many situations facile economic analysis shows coordination is “impossible” – Hardin’s tragedy of the commons – that in the real world institutions can evolve so as to help communities solve collective action problems.

The institution of the research university in which a scholar has resources to work with, gains membership to a set of interlocking “clubs”, and in return is expected to publish is an example of this kind of evolved institution. By “institution” I don’t just mean university, but more broadly Ostrom’s sense of: “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions”. Merton’s norms are an institution. But so are Mitroff’s anti-norms, the observation that the success of the research enterprise is in part dependent on behaviours exactly opposite to the ones that Merton prescribes: particularism, individualism, self-interestedness and organised dogmatism. To the extent that we recite standards of behaviour, and to the extent that we follow it, or indeed something else, culture is also an institution. This is where the economics intersects with the politics.

This is also where we finally get to publishing (and indeed to libraries). The publishing system is also an institution (or set of institutions) that function as infrastructure. The publishing system provides collective goods: access (albeit to a traditionally exclusive collective), discovery, archiving. The purpose of the institution that is the university is in part to provide a mechanism for compelling scholars to engage with that publishing system so as to provide that collective good. Not by any means the whole mechanism, nor is that its only purpose, but its a part.

Institutionalizing the publisher

The obvious follow-on question is what incentive do publishers have to engage with this collective good production? The obvious answer we would traditionally give is: to extract rents on monopoly rights to generate private goods. But that hasn’t always been the answer. In fact for most of the history of scholarly publishing its been a loss-making enterprise. We need to understand a bit more about that history and the trends that underly it before giving a definitive answer. I am borrowing a lot here from a workshop I went to which is reported in this set of papers in Notes and Records of the Royal Society.

Journal publishing arose out of clubs. First the clubs of emerging national academies like the Royal Society and then out of an increasing set of scholarly (including disciplinary) societies. The term “journal” actually dates from the 19th century and originally applied to serial publications that mixed both research and public interest material as a way to break even. Some of these were money making enterprises for the researchers involved but almost universally pure research and scholarly society journals lost money. They engaged publishers, or rather printers, by paying them for their services and the community subsidized the cost, both directly and through personal and institutional subscriptions.

In the mid to late 19thC relatively few researchers were paid by universities. Only those with endowed chairs were free to focus on research. Many active researchers were independently wealthy, some had wealthy patrons. Many, famously including Charles Darwin, interacted widely with correspondents from beyond the professional research sphere, including the full range of what we might now call citizen scientists. But at the same time professionalization was growing, and membership of the appropriate scholarly clubs, was only growing in importance. The gentleman scholar had the resources to engage, and more often than not the social status to demand attention. The growing class of professional researchers needed to gain access to the club, and publishing in the right place, being read in the right societies was a key part of that.

A journal is a club

My emphasis on clubs is deliberate. When journals (and to some extent the same is true of the University or Scholarly Press) were small, and focussed on a specific, recognizable community then the losses could be absorbed. The collective goods of the journal were created and individual members (subscribers, authors, community members) gained through association and identity. This continues to this day. The enterprise of creating a new scholarly discipline, a new club, invariably involves the creation of its cognate (or is that eponymous?) journal, even if that “journal” does not take a traditional form. See Chris Kelty’s fascinating “This is not an article” for a parallel example of this outside the journal world. The sustainability of these “clubs” with their various tiers of membership and benefits can be understood within the framework of Buchannan’s analysis of club economics.

Buchannan is a classical economist so his models make some assumptions. Specifically that all the club goods are ultimately exchangeable for money and that sustainability means an achievable equilibrium where positive externalities balance negative externalities. We are dealing with only partly exchangeable goods and equilibrium is a long way distant. Nonetheless there are useful lessons to be drawn about possible steady states. In particular Buchannan’s model turns on the question of what happens as the club changes in size. He shows that, where there is friction in access to the club goods – where it is not perfectly non-rivalrous – that this places limits on club size. In the print journal world friction arises in access for authors to the pages of the journal, access to the attention of readers and to the expert criticism of the community.

These trade-offs work when the community is small. Buchannan, Olson and Ostrom all tell us that negotiating these kinds of subsidies to support collective benefits can work when communities are small, homogeneous and have common goals. And to varying extents this was true of the various research communities up until WWII. But then they grew, an explosion of funding and an expansion of the institution of the university both geographically but also within traditional national centres of western scholarship, lead to a massive expansion. And arguably the system has been broken ever since.

The problem of scaling

While the set of readers and authors and funders of a journal are highly similar then there is a common body of culture and knowledge. Amongst other things this commonality reduces a number of costs, specifically of defining whether any given contribution is “acceptable”. Because there are common conceptions of what is within scope the internal sense of “quality” is cheap to determine. The “journal club” is contiguous with a “knowledge club”. This helps to define why society run journals are generally cheaper than commercially run ones, despite the claim that a market economist would make that the commercial run operation should be more competitive and efficient.

As we scale up the system a number of coping strategies emerge. One is specialisation, creating more and more specific communities and journals. This works and is a large part of the history of 20th century scholarly publishing. The price is paid in the creation of silos, an opportunity cost that is hard to delineate in which not only does cross fertilization not take place, but the modes of knowing and testing, the individual culture of each community becomes more and more incompatible with that of others.

If one approach is scale down, then the other is scale out. Scale up the journal to encompass more than one knowledge community. This also has potential to work, it grows the subscriber base and it can create prestige for the journal, attracting authors. But there’s a problem. Because the knowledge community is no longer singular or coherent the cost of determining inclusion becomes externalized. Because the club is no longer capable of determining a single standard a standard needs to be imposed. It turns out that PLOS ONE and Nature actually have the same problem. At PLOS ONE (and Scientific Reports) a small army of people are required to do the process of checking whether articles meet the standards. The most successful areas within PLOS ONE are those where there is a community (paleontology, neuroscience, some parts of genetics) that can do this policing, but across the broad remit of the journal its not possible to rely on academic editors and referees to get across everything and staff need to be brought on to manage that.

At Nature a small army of people (different job titles, different qualifications, but nonetheless) do exactly the same job. And again, they appear on the balance sheet. The complaint most frequently leveled at Nature is that “it doesn’t publish work of type X”. What’s actually happening is that individual editors within Nature have their own views, they create a community, one that is fundamentally predicated on prestige and excitement of being associated with the masthead. But the gaps, and indeed the failures of judgement, illustrate the exact same costs and challenges as the occasional dodgy papers that slip through the PLOS ONE system.

Separating equilibria and the luxury APC market

Another thing happens as the journals spread their scope. The attraction for membership shifts from being membership of the knowledge club, a form of identity politics if you like, to being prestige. Where there is high consistency between knowledge styles, a member of the club can reach an opinion about the quality of a given article. But the author of an astrophysics article in Nature cannot judge an article on neuroscience in the same journal, nor can the astrophysics editor judge that same article, at least not by any means that the neuroscience community would recognize. They can only judge the fact that it appears in that journal. The masthead is a proxy for something but it cannot possibly be a consistent characteristic of the work described in the article.

This might not be a problem in and of itself. In our manuscript on the issues around “Excellence”, we start by advancing the argument that the fact that the word is meaningless might not matter as long as it serves a useful political purpose in aligning the research community. But as we go on to show in that context the concept of “excellence” is actively harmful. It leads to hyper competition, and based on well established findings from behavioral psychology of rewards, leads to performance of excellence, not the characteristics of research we want.

Even this might not be a problem from an economic perspective. Markets need signals and can operate just fine with proxy signals that don’t actually mean anything. These markets tend to be volatile but that in and of itself is not a problem. But, as with excellence, it means that the market focusses on the proxy. In the subscription world this creates the “must-have” journals that authors seek to get into and strengthens their hold on the market. It concentrates power and helps to make big deals work. It focusses the publisher’s attention on maintaining prestige rather than quality of the process (for instance it took Science seven years to implement the same level of QA on statistical soundness as PLOS ONE).

In a subscription world this is just another set of perverse incentives, a lack of alignment between what would provide the greatest collective benefit, and the interests of monopoly rent seekers. This is neither surprising nor wholly avoidable. But something much worse happens with the shift to an APC model. There’s a lot of pretty naive economic analyses of this shift. Most recently you can see the interchange between David Schulenberger in a paper commissioned by the US Association of Research Libraries and Rick Anderson on Scholarly Kitchen.

In what should by now be a fairly familiar one-two the disagreement between the two centres on the power of authors in the market. Schulenberger argues that authors have zero market power, because they have no choice on where to publish, and therefore an effective author-side market can not emerge. Anderson argues that there is sufficient choice by listing prestigious journals in a number of fields, essentially showing there is more than one for any given field.

This form of simplistic analysis, which to be fair I’ve been guilty of in the past, however is unhelpful. The answer one gets tends to depend on how you frame the question. And that in turn is usually determined by how sloppy we are in defining what the market is. We need to understand how the author-side and reader-side markets differ and what is being purchased. Then we need to understand how those markets can break down. There’s a lot of work to be done here.

I want to cut to the chase here though and point out that both Schulenberger and Anderson can be right. Authors can have both substantial choice and buying power and prices can still rise. This happens in markets with specific properties. Markets where prestige sits at the centre. Markets where there is a disconnect between product quality and price. And worst of all, markets where price becomes a proxy for prestige. The APC market that we’ve built has all of these characteristics.

Luxury goods markets operate in situations where there are customers driven by prestige and some proportion are “rich”. Prices rise because it is in the interest of sellers to identify who is “rich”. Think of all those shops in airports, or most recently for me a Tesla dealership on a pedestrian mall in Sydney. Those shops are not for us. They are for people who can afford to walk in and just buy something. Sellers price otherwise unexceptionable goods at high prices to identify purchasers who will pay those high prices. If price can be set as a proxy for prestige (think cars, watches, handbags, haute couture) then the seller wins.

The rational economic move is for the rich person to not play the game. But in the APC world we have perfect conditions for a run away luxury goods market. Prestigious institutions demand prestigious scholars publish in prestigious venues to build up prestige. In the past they paid through the nose for this through subscriptions. But bringing authors into the loop and allowing the concretion of both traditional prestige markers and price as a proxy is potentially toxic. And without delving into the details, the situation seems even worse in the monograph space.

A brief segue on data

It’s worth taking a short sidestep into considering data and data sharing. For better or for worse data publishing doesn’t have the same prestige factor in play. We don’t fight to get our data into Zenodo and when rebuffed head to Figshare or vice versa. This is good – the same run away luxury goods market isn’t emerging – and bad – the institutions that motivate data sharing aren’t there for many disciplines. Where they are they are tied to formal article publication.

Data “publishers” perform much the same economic function as article publishers. They provide an arbitrage between the needs of readers and those of authors. They identify and define knowledge communities. They manage the quality assurance processes that the community defines. The objects are somewhat different but there is no reason to expect the economics to be fundamentally different. Differences in their funding will be signals of historical differences or differences in the value that a community places on articles vs data.

The issue of prestige we have already noted. This means, at least in part, that data sharing infrastructures must be more coupled to knowledge clubs, a factor that is clear in the disciplinary focus of many mature data sharing services. Adoption of broad-based data sharing services is driven more by either direct author benefits to sharing or by mandates. If a judgement were forced it might be argued that sharing through Figshare or Zenodo gains less prestige or community membership than submissions to PDB, Genbank or model organism databases. This actually mirrors community perceptions of general journals like Nature in the early part of 20th century. Publishing in disciplinary journals was viewed as more important – the idea that something of general interest is of more value is actually quite recent.

The funding of data infrastructures is also a challenge, and more so because the lack of prestige reduces the opportunities for creating commercial interest through monopoly rent opportunities. There are some examples, but they are generally residual monopolies from the print world. The Chemical Abstracts Service of the U.S. American Chemical Society stands out as an example. Other resources have gained the status of being two important to fail. The World Wide Protein Data Bank is an example of an infrastructure that is effectively top-sliced funding, albeit through the somewhat unstable mechanism of uncoordinated grants from a range of national funding agencies. Europe Pubmed Central is supported by a consortium of funders through a formal mechanism brokered by the UK’s Wellcome Trust.

Olson’s three options and the story of Crossref

These different stories map onto the paths that Olson described in the 60s as the means by which groups could solve collective action problems. Above a certain size he saw only three options. First is a kind of technicality, where the community is structured so that a small number of players dominate the space. Europe Pubmed Central is an example of this, the Wellcome Trust and a few other players, originally restricted to the UK could get around a table and just decide to act.

The second path is one where there is a non-collective benefit that contributors receive in exchange for supporting the collective benefit. Subscriptions are the traditional version of this, but membership models of all sorts generally involve a benefit. Sometimes, as I would suggest is the case for the Open Library of Humanities, that benefit is being seen to provide leadership, demonstrating a progressive stance. There will be more models like this in the future but there are questions about how they can scale – its not a cool kids club when everyone is a member. The Cambridge Crystallographic Data Centre is an example that tries the square the circle, providing some subscription access benefits while making most data available in some form.

The final approach is compulsion. At the nation state level general taxation funds collective goods and we (or at least most of us) don’t get a choice about contributing. Access to the Chemical Abstracts Service is pretty much a requirement of running a serious chemistry operation, one that the ACS protects by trying very hard to ensure its also a requirement for certification for chemistry courses. Regulatory capture is also a good strategy, as regulated professions like medicine and the law can attest. Standards, pace Malamud, operate in a similar manner.

The story of Crossref, the provider of article DOIs and de facto home of scholarly bibliographic metadata is instructive. Crossref was started essentially by fiat by a small number of publishers. In practice between five and nine publishers dominate the market. The heads of houses (they have been known to call themselves that on occasion) will meet and agree certain things. The setup and early funding of Crossref was one of those. This is Olson’s first option, effective oligopoly.

Once setup, Crossref offered a membership benefit. The growing infrastructure of DOI referrals and the improvements in article discovery led to traffic to publisher websites. And those numbers could be sold back to subscribing libraries. Both the ability to assign DOIs and the traffic are non-collective benefits of membership, and ones that increase in value as the collective good, the growing pool of public metadata and infrastructure to use it, grows in turn.

Finally today, membership of Crossref is effectively compulsory for any serious publisher of scholarly articles in STM, and increasingly for book and HSS publishers. It’s just part of the costs of doing business. A compulsory, tax-like, part of the system. Now compare the growth of ORCID. ORCID was also started largely because publishers decided it was a good idea. A few funders came on board but it was really publishers who put the money in up front. Gradually the funders have come in (again, really there are maybe 20 really important funders at a global scale), but the institutions? Institutions have been rubbish, despite actually being the place where the greatest benefits probably accrue. There are just too many to get past the collective action problem. We’re starting to see progress now, not because the universities have got their act together but because national level coordination is starting to kick in.

This story repeats itself pretty much every time the scholarly communications infrastructure needs an upgrade. Publishers move first, not because they have the most capital. The institutions do. Harvard could buy Elsevier and Wiley and T&F and SpringerNature and have cash to spare to throw in Calvariate or whatever they’re calling the rebranded ISI and PLOS for good measure. And not because the publishers have more freedom of movement. Publishers have share holders, or at least owners, who want a return. Many funders are in a much better place to call shots. The publishers move because they can, because there are few of them.

The future of the library

Which brings us to the university library and its unique place. What can we learn here? Maybe the IR infrastructure is a counter example? What do these models tell us about the success of institutional repositories? Well it suggests that those that started in a department (small, homogenous) will work better than those started at scale (Harvard and Southampton spring to mind). That those which provide a non-collective benefit back may be able to scale (Minho provides a great example of this with its competition with cash prizes for the best department). And that where those two do not hold that success will depend on effective compulsion (Liege, and the genius of Bernard Rentier obviously).

The library itself is a club good, membership of the university provides access to resources and people. The digital resources are non-rivalrous, but exclusive – even if that is exclusion is no access control. But Sci-hub and its inevitable successors blow an enormous hole in that. Privileged access to digital content will not survive as a sufficient value. Access to people, to expertise, now that’s different because that’s rivalrous. Proximity still matters. But services can also be bought elsewhere and the artist formerly known as the publisher is rapidly moving into that space. Neutral, non-biased advice in the interest of the researcher or broader university member is a good differential to start with, but focussing on how membership of the university is linked to access to the right kind of relevant expertise is key.

The institution itself, and the library within it, is pretty much at the worst of all worlds scale. Too large for collective action, too small and internally fractious to act unilaterally. Too many to solve the combined collective action problem. Collectives, thematic and geographic might provide solutions, and some actions the institutional leadership can take unilaterally and internally. But as currently disposed the university system globally is almost designed to prevent effective action.

The ways forward

The thing that the scholarly community has, if it can regain control of the institution is capital. I know it’s not proper to turn into a Marxist in middle age but this is fundamentally a question of control over deployment of capital and the position of labour. The labour sits almost entirely within the university and the scholarly community. Between libraries, scholarly societies, scholars and the institution.

But capital, or at least free capital, has been deployed largely by corporate interests and publishers in particular. Except that there is much more capital sitting with the funders and more importantly the institutions. Maybe it is time to challenge what the endowments and pension funds of institutions are supposed to be for. Maybe a trillion dollars is tied up, not being put to the use of the mission of these – often legally speaking charitable – institutions.

If you accept my argument that the institutional purpose of a university is to compel the publication of research outputs, as part of the contract of being a professional scholar, then the true Marxist would necessarily argue that the institutional capital, both financial and non-financial, must be liberated into the hands of labour. Ok, that may be a little radical. Particularly here in the Triangle.

There are some more practical goals. Ostrom shows us that institutions can grow in which collectives form collectives. If we focus on good community design and on shared principles of behavior, on building strong culture then our local communities, where we can solve the collective action problem, can band together at a higher level to solve the bigger problems. Stop seeing the university as a company with a CEO and see it as a collective of communities with a Community Manager. Leadership is not a dirty word in communities: leading from the front, leading from the middle, or leading from behind can all be successful. But leading by fiat will not be.

Still too radical? These communities are growing. Support them. The rise of collectives, OLH, Knowledge Unlatched, but also new forms of scholarly societies: the Research Data Alliance, ArXiv, FORCE11. Help these to grow, support them financially where you can, and with moral support where you can’t. We can work towards service definition. Let’s take the publisher’s at their word. They want to be a service operation: lets collectively define those services and our requirements. When I talk to the “big bad wolves” they are just as keen to have the space where they should bring their commercial sensitivities mapped out. But they can’t wait forever for us to make up our mind.

We need to reduce costs. I haven’t really talked about the structural aspects of costs in scholarly communications and how they are changing but there are opportunities for orders of magnitude reductions. To achieve that we need shared infrastructures. But for those we need funding models, which will necessarily be compulsory, and for those we need some form of shared governance. No taxation without representation. What does that mean in our space? And how can that be equitable. One of the other things Olson shows is that in delivering collective benefits the small will exploit the large. Time for the big institutional players to suck it up and play that role.

Finally we need to do everything in our power to sever the connection between prestige and price. By whatever means are necessary that link needs to be stomped on, disavowed or destroyed. Frankly, this one seems harder than the Marxist revolution. But if we fail at this we will reap the whirlwind. APC based models are growing. Separating equilibrium gives us two things, run away luxury prices, and a commodity product market for those that can’t afford the costs of luxury.

This isn’t just inequitable, and it doesn’t just damage the diversity of views on which scholarship depends. It is unaffordable at both ends. First because the luxury goods market will rise until it gets smaller and smaller, bankrupting the publishers that need to chase that extra differentiating piece of leather trim first, and then the research communities that are paying for it. But at the other end the commodity market is being supported by the rise, not of the predatory journal, which are frankly small fry in the scheme of things, but the predatory author.

The industrialization of fraud and plagiarism is already leading to an arms race which will rapidly raise prices. Just as we’ve seen at PLOS ONE and Scientific Reports, the potential savings from technology development will be swallowed up in layers of checks for author and referee identities, validating figures, checking for ever more sophisticated plagiarism. That’s the real story of the price rises – that the drop in the quality of submissions leads to an increase in the necessity for professional checks. And that is also unaffordable.

The optimal answer probably lies in smaller journals, and smaller, community based, data repositories, built on a common infrastructure that makes these cheap to run. An efficient market in services where innovation isn’t driven entirely by the possibility of a 100x sell out, but where commercial competition also plays its role. I don’t know if its possible to get there from here. But if we can then the big shift will be the role of knowledge communities, taking control of their own processes, within a shared framework that makes that easy to do.

To return to my original point. We want communities to create knowledge, and we want them to invest in sharing that to wider audiences in a way that is both principled and makes economic sense. The best way to do that is to provide platforms and infrastructures that make that investment both cheap, and provides good returns. What does the community, the club, get back in return? We will need new forms of economics to figure this out, the work on the economics of clubs and of commons, is still only beginning. But this will be the crucial knowledge we need to design new and improved institutions for the future.

Speculation: Sociality and “soundness”. Is this the connection across disciplines?

Italiano: network sociality
Italiano: network sociality (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

A couple of ideas have been rumbling along in the background for me for a while. Reproducibility and what it actually means or should mean has been the issue du jour for a while. As we revised the Excellence manuscript in response to comments and review reports, we also needed to dig a bit deeper into what it was that distinguishes the qualities of the concept of “soundness” from “excellence”. Are they both merely empty and local terms or is there something different about “proper scholarly practice” that we can use to help us.

At the same time I’ve been on a bit of a run reading some very different perspectives on the philosophy of knowledge (with an emphasis on science). I started with Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, followed up with Latour’s Politics of Nature and Shapin and Schaeffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump, and currently am combining E O Wilson’s Consilience with Ravetz’s Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems. Barbara Herrnstein Smith’s Contingencies of Value and Belief and Resistance are also in the mix. Books I haven’t read – at least not beyond skimming through - include key works by Merton, Kuhn, Foucault, Collins and others, but I feel like I’m getting a taste of the great divide of the 20th century.

I actually see more in common across these books than divides them. What every serious study of how science works agrees on is the importance of social and community processes in validating claims. While they disagree violently on what that validation actually means all of these differing strands of work show that it is explicit and implicit processes within communities, supported by explicit and implicit knowledge of how they operate and who is who, and who gets to say what, and when. The Mertonian norm of “organised scepticism” might be re-cast by some as “organised critique within an implicit frame of knowledge and power” but no-body is arguing that this process, which can be studied and critiqued, crucially can be compared, is not dependent on community processes. Whatever else it is, scholarship is social, occurring within institutions – that are the product of history – that influence the choices that individual scholars make.

In the Excellence pre-print we argued that “excellence” was an empty term, at best determined by a local opinion about what matters. But the obvious criticism of our suggesting “soundness” as an alternate is that soundness is equally locally determined and socially constructed: soundness in computational science is different to soundness in literature studies, or experimental science or theoretical physics. This is true, but misses the point. There is an argument to be made that soundness is a quality of the process by which an output is created, whereas “excellence” is a quality of the output itself. If that argument is accepted alongside the idea that the important part of the scholarly process is social then we have a potential way to audit the idea of soundness proposed by any given community.

If the key to scholarly work is the social process of community validation then it follows that “sound research” follows processes that make the outputs social. Or to be more precise, sound research processes create outputs that have social affordances that support the processes of the relevant communities. Sharing data, rather than keeping it hidden, means an existing object has new social affordances. Subjecting work to peer review is to engage in a process that creates social affordances of particular types. The quality of description that supports reproducibility (at all its levels) provides enhanced social affordances. What all of these things have in common is that better practice involves making outputs more social.

“More social” on its own is clearly not enough. There is a question here of more social for who? And the answer to that is going to be some variant of “the relevant scholarly community”. We can’t avoid the centrality of social construction, because scholarship is a social activity, undertaken by people, within networks of power and resource relationships. What forms of social affordance are considered necessary or sufficient is going to differ from one community to another, but this may be something that the all have in common. And that may be something we can work with.

 

FAIR enough? FAIR for one? FAIR for all!

English: Brussels Accessible Art Fair Logo
Brussels Accessible Art Fair Logo (Wikipedia)

The development of the acronym “FAIR” to describe open data was a stroke of genius. Standing for “Findable, Accessible, Interoperable and Reusable” it describes four attributes of datasets that are aspirations to achieve machine readability and re-use for an open data world. The short hand description provided by four attributes as well as a familiar and friendly word have led to its adoption as a touchstone for funders and policy groups including the G20 Hangzhao Concensus, the Amsterdam Call for Action on Open Science, the NIH Data Commons and the European Open Science Cloud.

At the FORCE11 Workshop on the Scholarly Commons this week in San Diego inclusion was a central issue. The purpose of the workshop was to work towards a shared articulation of principles or requirements that would define this shared space. To make any claim of a truly shared and global conception of this “scholarly commons” we clearly need to bake in inclusive processes. In particular we need our systems, rules and norms to remind us, at every turn, to consider different perspectives, needs and approaches. It is easy to sign up to principles that say there should be no barriers to involvement, but much harder to maintain awareness of barriers that we don’t see or experience.

The coining of FAIR was led by a community that want to emphasise that we need to expand our idea of audiences to include machine readers. As the Scholarly Commons discussion proceeded, and FAIR kept returning as a touch point I wondered whether we could use its traction for a further expansion, as a mnemonic that would remind us to consider the barriers that we don’t see ourselves. Can we embed in the idea of FAIR the inclusion of users and contributors from different geographies, cultures, backgrounds, and levels of access to research? And might something along the lines of making research “FAIR for All” achieve that?

As I looked at the component parts of FAIR it seemed like this could be a really productive approach:

Accessible

Originally conceived of as “available”, accessibility lends itself easily to expanding in scope to fit with this agenda. Can it be accessed without pay barriers online? Is it accessible to a machine? To a person without web access? To a speaker of a different language? To a non-expert? To someone with limited sight? There are many different types of accessibility but by forcing ourselves to consider a wider scope we can enhance inclusion. Many people have made excellent arguments that “access is not accessibility” and we can build on that strong base.

Interoperable

In the original FAIR Data Principles, Interoperability is concerned mainly with the use of  standard descriptions language and how resources make reference to related resources. For our purposes we can ask what systems and cultures can a project or resource interoperate with. Is it useable by policy makers? Can it be disseminated via print shops where internet access is not appropriate? Does it link into widely used information systems like Wikipedia (and in the future WikiData). Does the form of the resource, or the project, make it incompatible with other efforts?

Re-usable

For machine use of data, re-usability is reasonably easily defined. If we seek to expand the definition it gets more diffuse. This is more than just licensing (although open licensing can help) but also relates to formats and design. Is software designed to be multilingual and are resources provided in a form that supports translation? Are documents provided in editable form as well as print or PDF? While accessibility, interoperability and re-usability are all clearly related they give us a different lens to check our commitment to inclusion.

Findability

As I thought through the four components it seemed that discoverability might not fit the agenda well, but as I thought it through it became clear that discoverability is perhaps the most important aspect to consider. As an extreme example, something indexed in Google, or available via Wikimedia Commons doesn’t help if there is no network access. But more generally, the way in which we all search for information shapes the things we discover, and is the first necessary condition for engagement. From the challenges of getting Open Access books into library catalogues to the question of how patients can efficiently search for relevant research, via the systemic problems of how consumer search engines increasingly fail to provide clear provenance for information, the issue of inclusion and engagement starts, and far too often ends, with the challenges of discovery.

Conclusions

A few things become clear in considering this expansion of scope. The FAIR Data principles provide some clear proscriptions and tests for compliance. Issues of inclusion are much more open ended. When have we done enough? What audiences do we need to consider? In that sense it becomes much more a direction of travel than an easily definable goal to reach. But actually that was the initial goal, to prompt and provoke us to think more.

It also expands the question of the thing that is FAIR. For FAIR data we need only consider the resource, generally a dataset. With this expansion it is clear that it is both resources and the projects that generate them that we need to consider. A project could generate FAIR outputs without being FAIR itself. But again, this is a journey, not a destination. If we can hold ourselves to a higher standard then we will make progress towards that goal. With limited resources there will be difficult choices to make, but we can still use this idea as a prompt, to ask ourselves if we can do better.

If our goal is to do research that is “FAIR for All”, then we can test ourselves as we improve towards that goal by continuing to ask ourselves at each stage.

Is this FAIR enough?

 

 

Submission to the European Commission Expert Group on Altmetrics

As part of the broader Open Science agenda of the European Commission an expert group on “altmetrics” has been formed. This group has a remit to consider how indicators of research performance can be used effectively to enhance the strategic goals of the commission and the risks and opportunities that new forms of data pose to the research enterprise. This is my personal submission. 

Next Generation Altmetrics

Submission by Cameron Neylon, Professor of Research Communications, Curtin University

1. Introduction

The European Commission has an ambitious program for Open Science as part of three aspirations, Open Innovation, Open Science, and Open to the World. Key to defining the role of evaluation, and within that the role of metrics, in achieving all these aspirations is a clear understanding of the opportunities and limitations that our new, data-rich, environment creates. I therefore welcome the Commission’s call for evidence and formation of the expert group.

My expertise in this area is based on a long term interest in the intersection between research evaluation and policy implementation, specifically the role that new indicators can play in helping to drive (or hinder) cultural change. I was an author of the Altmetrics Manifesto[1] as well as the first major paper on Article Level Metrics[2]. I have more recently (in my previous role as Advocacy Director at PLOS) been closely engaged in technology and policy development, and wrote the PLOS submission to the HEFCE Metrics enquiry[3]. Since leaving PLOS I have been focusing on developing a research program looking at how technology and incentives combine to effect the culture of research communities. In this context recent work has included the preprint (currently under review) Excellence R Us[4] which has gained significant attention, and two reports for Jisc[5,6], that address related issues of evaluation and culture.

2. Next generation Metrics for open science

A. How do metrics, altmetrics & ‘responsible metrics’ fit within the broader EC vision & agenda for open science?

Delivering on the Commission’s agenda across the research policy platform requires a substantial culture change across a range of stakeholders. The cultures of research communities, and the practices that they support are diverse and often contradictory. It is important to separate the question of evaluation and how indicators support this, how evaluation contributes to the overall incentives that individuals and organisations experience, and what effect changes in incentives have on culture. Thoughtful evaluation, including the application of new and improved indicators can contribute to, but will not, on its own, drive change.

B. What are the key policy opportunities and tensions in this area? What leadership role can the EU play in wider international debates?

There are two opportunities that the current environment offers. First, the Commission can take a progressive leadership position on research evaluation. As the HEFCE Metrics enquiry and many others have concluded, much research evaluation has the tail wagging the dog: available indicators drive targets and therefore behaviour. It is necessary to reframe evaluation around what public research investment is for and how different stakeholder goals can be tensioned and prioritised. The Commission can take a leadership role here. The second opportunity is in using new indicators to articulate the values that underpin the Commission’s policy agenda. In this sense using indicators that provide proxies of the qualities that align with the Open Science agenda can provide a strong signal to research communities, researchers and RPOs that these aspects (collaboration, open access, data accessibility, evidence of re-use) are important to the Commission.

3. Altmetrics: The emerging state of the art

A. How can we best categorise the current landscape for metrics and altmetrics? How is that landscape changing? How robust are various leading altmetrics, and how does their robustness compare to more ‘traditional’ bibliometrics?

The landscape of available indicators is diverse and growing, both in the range of indicators available and the quality of data underpinning them. That said, this increase is from a low base. The current quality and completeness of data underlying indicators, both new and traditional, does not meet basic standards of transparency, completeness or equity. These indicators are neither robust, stable nor reliable. Auditing and critical analysis is largely impossible because data is generally proprietary. On top of this, the analysis of this data to generate indicators is in most cases highly naïve and undertheorized. This can be seen in a literature providing conflicting results on even basic questions of how different indicators correlate with each other. Bibliometrics while more established suffer from many of the same problems. There is greater methodological rigour within the bibliometrics research community but much of the use of this data are by users without this experience and expertise.

B. What new problems and pitfalls might arise from their usage?

The primary risk in the use of all such poorly applied indicators and metrics is that individuals and organizations refocus their efforts on performing against metrics instead of delivering on the qualities of research that the policy agenda envisions. Lack of disciplinary and output-type coverage is a serious issue for representation, particularly across the arts and humanities as noted in the HEFCE Metrics report.

C. What are some key conclusions and unanswered questions from the fast-growing literature in this area?

With some outstanding exceptions the literature on new indicators is methodologically weak and under-theorized. In particular, there is virtually no work looking at the evolution of indicator signals over time. There is a fundamental failure to understand these indicators as a signal of underlying processes. As a result there is a tendency to seek indicators that match particular qualities (e.g. “influence”) rather than understand how a particular process (e.g. effective communication to industry) leads to specific signals. Core to this failure is the lack of a framework for defining how differing indicators can contribute to answering a strategic evaluative question, and a tendency to create facile mathematical constructs of available data and defining them as a notionally desired quality.

4. Data infrastructure and standards

I refer the expert group to the conclusions of the HEFCE Metrics report, the PLOS submission to that enquiry[3] and to my report to Jisc[6] particularly on the issues of access to open citations data. Robust, trusted and responsible metrics require an open and transparent data infrastructure, with robust and critical data quality processes, alongside open processes subjected to full scholarly critical analysis.

The Commission has the capacity and resources to lead infrastructure development, including in data and technology as well as social infrastructures such as standards. My broad recommendation is that the Commission treat administrative and process data with the same expectations of openness, quality assurance, re-usablity and critical analysis as the research data that it funds. The principles of Open Access, transparency, and accountability all apply. As with research data, privacy and other issues arise and I commend the Commission’s position that data should be “as open as possible, as closed as necessary”.

5. Cultures of counting: metrics, ethics and research

A. How are new metrics changing research cultures (in both positive and negative ways)? What are the implications of different metrics and indicators for equality and diversity?

The question of diversity has been covered in the PLOS submission to the HEFCE Enquiry[3]. Indicators and robust analysis can both be used to test for issues of diversity but can also create issues for diversity. These issues are also covered in detail in our recent preprint4. Culture has been changing towards a more rigid, homogeneous and performative stance. This is dangerous and counter to the policy goals of the Commission. It will only be addressed by developing a strong culture of critical evaluation supported by indicators.

B. What new dynamics of gaming and strategic response are being incentivized?

Gaming is a complex issue. On one side there is “cheating”, on the other an adjustment of practice towards policy goals (e.g. wider engagement with users of research through social media). New indicators are arguably more robust to trivial gaming than traditional single data-source metrics. Nonetheless we need to develop institutional design approaches that promote “strategic responses” in the desired direction, not facile performance against quantitative targets.

6. Next generation metrics: The way forward

A. Can we identify emerging best practices in this area? What recommendations might we as a group make, and to which actors in EU research systems?

There are structural reasons why it is difficult to identify specific examples of best practice. I take the thoughtful use of data and derived indicators to support strategic decision making against clearly defined goals and values as the ideal. The transparency and audit requirements of large scale evaluations make this difficult. Smaller scale evaluation that is not subject to external pressures is most likely to follow this path. Amongst the large scale efforts that best exemplify efforts to reach these goals is the UK REF, where the question of what “excellence” is to be determined is addressed with some specificity and in Impact Narratives where data was used to support a narrative claim against defined evaluation criteria.

Overall we need to develop a strong culture of evaluation.

  • The Commission can support this directly through actions that provide public and open data sources for administrative and activity data and through adopting critical evaluative processes internally. The Commission can also act to lead and encourage adoption of similar practice across European Funding Organisations, including through work with Science Europe.
  • Institutions and funders can support development of stronger critical evaluation processes (including that of evaluating those processes themselves) by implementing developing best practice as it is identified and by supporting the development of expertise, including new research, within their communities.
  • Scholarly Societies can play a strong role in articulating the distinctive nature of their communities’ work and what classes of indicators may or may not be appropriate in assessment of that. They are also valuable potential drivers of the narratives that can support culture change
  • Researchers can player a greater role by being supported to consider evaluation as part of the design of research programs. Developing a critical capacity for determining how to assess a program (as opposed to developing the skills required to defend it all costs) would be valuable.
  • Publics can be engaged to define some of the aspects of what matters to them in the conduct and outcomes of research and how performance against those measures might be demonstrated and critically assessed to their satisfaction.

References

  1. Priem et al (2010), altmetrics: a manifesto, http://altmetrics.org
  2. Wu and Neylon (2009), Article Level Metrics and the Evolution of Scientific Impact, PLOS Biology, http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1000242
  3. PLOS (2013), PLOS Submission to the HEFCE RFI on Metrics in Research Assessment, http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1089555
  4. Moore et al (2016): Excellence R Us: University Research and the Fetishisation of Excellence. https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3413821.v1
  5. Neylon, Cameron (2016) Jisc Briefing Document on Data Citations, http://repository.jisc.ac.uk/id/eprint/6399
  6. Neylon, Cameron (2016) Open Citations and Responsible Metrics, http://repository.jisc.ac.uk/id/eprint/6377

Squaring Circles: The economics and governance of scholarly infrastructures

This is a version of the paper I’ve had accepted for SciDataCon in a session on the sustainability of Research Data Infrastructures. It was also the basis for the session that I helped lead with Simon Coles at the Jisc-CNI meeting in mid-July in Oxford. The original version was quite short and skips over some of the background material and context. I’m hoping to work it up into a full paper at some point soon so any comments are welcome.

Summary

Infrastructures for data, such as repositories, curation systems, aggregators, indexes and standards are public goods. This means that finding sustainable economic models to support them is a challenge. This is due to free-loading, where someone who does not contribute to the support of the infrastructure nonetheless gains the benefit of it. The work of Mancur Olson (1965) suggests there are only three ways to address this for large groups: compulsion (often as some form of taxation) to support the infrastructure; the provision of non-collective (club) goods to those who contribute; or mechanisms that change the effective number of participants in the negotiation.

Subscription and membership models such as those used for online subscription journals and for some data infrastructures have been our traditional model and are an example of the second approach. These models are breaking down as the technology of the web and the agenda for transparency and open access leads to unbundling, the separate of the different services being provided. This tends to mean commercial suppliers focus on club and private good provision and neglect public good provision. Addressing this will require the development of support models more like taxation. However systems of taxation require a shared – and ideally globally shared – sense of the principles of governance and resource distribution.

In this paper I argue that the focus on sustainability models prior to seeking a set of agreed governance principles is the wrong approach. Rather we need to understand how to navigate from club-like to public-like goods. We need to define the communities that contribute and identify club-like benefits for those contributors. We need interoperable principles of governance and resourcing to provide public-like goods and we should draw on the political economics of taxation to develop this.

The provisioning challenge for public scholarly goods

The fundamental political and economic challenge for groups is the provision of “public goods” or “general utility”. These are goods that are non-rivalrous – they can be infinitely shared – and non-excludable – it is difficult or impossible to stop someone using them. Classical economics tells us there is a provisioning problem for such goods, the rational individual actor will never contribute because whether they do or not, they can still benefit.

Infrastructures, such as repositories for data, articles and code, are very close to the ideal of public goods. Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action (1965) discusses how group size has a profound influence on the provision of public goods, in particular noting that provision is only possible for small groups, or where the public good is a byproduct of the provision of non-public goods that are provided to contributors.

Indeed Olson’s description of the groups that can and cannot provide public goods maps closely onto scholarly infrastructures. Small communities frequently develop local infrastructures out of existing resources (and the contributions to these are usually biased strongly to the larger players in that community as Olson predicts). Large scale infrastructures are also provided by collaboration between small communities but in this case a community of funders (such as those that fund Europe Pubmed Central) or national governments (as is the case for physical infrastructures that are generally formed as Inter-governmental Organisation like CERN). The transition from small to large is challenging and “medium” sized infrastructures struggle to survive, moving from grant to grant, and in many cases shifting to a subscription model.

In the case of digital infrastructures a public good (such as an online article or dataset) can be converted to a club good (made excludable) by placing an authentication barrier around it to restrict access to subscribers (as is the case for online subscription journals and databases). Buchannan and those that further developed his 1965 paper on the economics of clubs have probed how club goods and club size relate (Buchannan, 1965). A core finding is that such sustainable clubs have an equilibrium size that depends on congestion in access to good (the extent to which it is purely non-rivalrous) and the value it provides. With digital resources congestion is low, and the club can therefore grow large. This creates a challenge. Digital resources are not natively excludable, a technical barrier has to be put in place. As the group size rises the likelihood of “leakage” (sharing, or piracy if you prefer) increases. Thus resources are expended on strengthening excludability which leads to both economic and political costs as seen in the Open Access debate.

Solutions to the provisioning problem

If our political goal is to provide large scale access, to make the goods created more public-like through the provision of shared infrastructures then we need to develop a political economics of this “public-making”. Olson provides three routes to creating sustainable infrastructures providing public goods:

  • Compulsion: The good is provided through a mechanism that requires contributions from the whole community. Closed Union Shops, where all workers in a given company are required to be members of a union are an example that Olson discusses in detail. Taxation is another example. In the scholarly infrastructure space, overhead and indirect costs taken by institutions are an example, as is the top slicing of funder budgets to provide infrastructures and services.
  • By-product: The public good is provided through a mechanism that additionally provides club-like and/or private goods to contributors. Olson discusses insurance schemes only available to members of mutual benefit societies that also lobby on behalf of their members. In the research enterprise publishers have to join Crossref to be able to assign Crossref DOIs to outputs (a club good). As a by-product the whole community has access to an interoperable metadata set with defined schemas and access points (a public good).
  • Effective oligopoly: There are far too many funders globally for them to (easily) agree a mechanism for all contributing to any shared scheme. However because a relatively small set of funders fund a substantial proportion of biomedical research they are able to agree mechanisms to fund data infrastructures such as Europe Pubmed Central. Other funders may contribute but many will free-ride.

The difficult truth is that there is no mechanism that will directly lead to a large community supporting the provision of a large-scale public good infrastructure. Any successful sustainability model will depend on some mixture of these three approaches for resourcing. There are interesting models for solving some of these collective action problems such as crowd-funding models where a project only proceeds if sufficient contributions are made, but these amount in effect to new ways to implement compulsion and often also depend on a by-product strategy (the contributor benefits).

If our challenge in delivering on the openness and transparency agenda is one of supporting the conversion of successful medium-scale club-like provision of infrastructure into open systems providing public goods then we need to solve the political and economic problems of transitioning from the club state to a model that successfully provides a mix of these models.

The politics of compulsion: The need for shared principles

Of the three approaches to sustainability, it is generally the second which infrastructures are expected to pursue as they grow. Membership models can work in those cases where there are club goods being created which attract members. Training experiences or access to valued meetings are possible examples. In the wider world this parallels the “Patreon” model where members get exclusive access to some materials, access to a person (or more generally expertise), or a say in setting priorities. Much of this mirrors the roles that Scholarly Societies play or at least could play.

In the scholarly infrastructures space the compulsion/taxation and oligopoly approach are very similar in practice as top slicing funder resources amounts to a tax on overall research funds. Some membership models also approach the level of compulsion. While this is rare in scholarly communities, it is common in professional communities such as medicine, law, and some areas of engineering. Schemes offering professional certification (including the validation of degree programs) blur this boundary as well.

The word “compulsion” is pejorative but there are many activities within the work of researchers that are compulsory. Gaining a doctorate, publishing at some level, having access to the literature in some form are all effectively compulsory. These forms of compulsion (or call them “social expectations” if you prefer) are considered acceptable because the fit within a known and understood system of rules. Systems of taxations are acceptable, according to Adam Smith (1776) where there is proportionality, predictability, convenience and efficiency. Today we would also add representation in governance and sustainability. This requires us to build institutions, in the sense that Elinor Ostrom describes them: “institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom, 2005). Much of political economics is bound up in trying to justify post-hoc the provision of institutions like governments, courts, the law by inventing things like “the social contract”. Our advantage as a community, or communities, is that we could explicitly develop agree principles of operation as a way of reducing the costs of creating institutions.

A common set of principles for foundational infrastructures

Building institutions is hard. It takes resources. To reduce costs it makes sense to build templates; sets of agreed principles under which such institutions and systems should operate. If our communities can sign up to a set of principles up front, then building institutions and infrastructures that reflect those principles should become a lot easier.

To address this a draft set of principles were developed to provoke a conversation about the governance and management of these infrastructures (Bilder, Lin, Neylon, 2015). Our principles rest on three pillars: transparency and community governance; financial sustainability, efficiency and commitment to community needs; and mechanisms to protect integrity and manage and mitigate the risk of failures. They draw from the observation of successes in providing foundational infrastructures and seek to generalise these. The focus is on building trustworthy institutions.

Outline of principles for Open Scholarly Infrastructures
Figure 1: Principles for Open Scholarly Infrastructures

It is interesting to note that these also map quite closely to Adam Smith’s four principles for sound taxation (Smith, 1776). The commitment to representation is more modern, and the concept of enabling a community to fork a project through committing to Open Source and Open Data – while modern in its approach – is an expression of the principle of efficiency, a mechanism for the community to restrain costs in effect.

The principles (or a future refinement or replacement for them) can serve in two ways. First they could be used to set out the minimum requirements for governance and sustainability that are required before funders are willing to directly fund (the oligogopoly or tax mechanisms). Second they provide a template for a developing club, either one built in a community sufficiently small to bootstrap its funding, or one that has found a byproduct model, to demonstrate its ability to make the transition from club to infrastructure.

Predictions and practical consequences

The preceding is an abstract argument. What are its practical consequences for actually sustaining infrastructures? First we can make a prediction to be tested:
All sustainable scholarly infrastructures providing collective (public-like) goods to the research community will be funded on one of the three identified models (taxation, byproduct, oligopoly) or some combination of them.

Second, we can look at stable long standing infrastructures (Crossref, Protein Data Bank, NCBI, arXiv, SSRN) and note that in most cases governance arrangements are an accident of history and were not explicitly planned. Crises of financial sustainability (or challenges of expansion) for these organisations are often coupled to or lead to a crisis in governance, and in some cases a breakdown of community trust. Changes are therefore often made to governance in response to a specific crisis.

Where there is governance planning it frequently adopts a “best practice” model which looks for successful examples to draw from. It is not often based on “worse case scenario” planning. We suggest that this is a problem. We can learn as much from failures of sustainability and their relationship to governance arrangements as from successes.

Above all the key is to learn from our experiences, as well as from the theory of economics and governance to identify the patterns and templates that provide resilient organisations and infrastructures that through being trustworthy earn the trust of their communities through both the good times and the bad.

References

  • Bilder G, Lin J, Neylon C 2015 Principles for Open Scholarly Infrastructure-v1, Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1314859 [Last Accessed 30 May 2016]
  • Buchannan, JM 1965 An Economic Theory of Clubs Economica, 32(125):1-14
  • Olson, M 1965 The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Revised ed.). Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachussets
  • Ostrom, E 2005 Understanding Institutional Diversity (Revised ed.). Princeton University Press, Princeton
  • Smith, A 1776 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London

A letter to my MP, the Honourable Ben Howlett, member for Bath

The Honourable Ben Howlett MP
Member for Bath
House of Commons, United Kingdom

Dear Ben,

I need to come clean at the beginning of this letter. I did not vote for you in the general election. I am unlikely to vote for you or any member of your party in the future. We come from different political, and I would imagine cultural backgrounds. Nonetheless we were on the same side of the debate for the referendum. This as I will return to, offers me some hope for repairing the damage that has been done.

I write without the ability to offer any answers but with the hope that some of my perspectives might be useful in helping you reach the difficult decisions you will have to make on how to vote in parliament over the next few months. I am an immigrant of Australian birth and a UK citizen. I am a researcher, but one that holds a post in a foreign university, and a small business owner, and a resident of your constituency. Because a substantial proportion of my income comes from overseas the referendum, and its outcome, has made me substantially better off in the short term, just as it makes the UK a substantially less attractive place to do my work in the longer term. This is an irony that leaves a bad taste in my mouth.

As you consider your position on key votes over the next few months I would ask you to consider the following three issues as central to the argument of how we proceed together:

First, the platform the referendum was fought on was a farce. We are rapidly heading to a situation where no-one will get what they thought they were voting for. Those of us who voted to remain are told it is impossible because the referendum fell the other way by a 2% margin. Those who voted to leave so as to repatriate funds paid to the EU were the first to be told they were lied to. Those that voted to leave due to concerns over immigration were the next to be disappointed. As we go into negotiations and it becomes clear that we will retain the vast majority of EU regulations and requirements so as to retain access to the single market those who voted for less regulation will the last group to discover that no element of the Leave platform will actually be delivered in practice. Referenda are blunt instruments at the best of times.

The result is also a demographic tragedy. It has already been suggested that by the time negotiations are concluded a re-run referendum could deliver a majority to remain in the EU, even if no-one changed their minds[1, 2, 3], simply due to the divergence in the proportion of young and old voters voting Leave and Remain. The combination of a lack of a clear plan of action, demographics and the inevitable delay for negotiation, and the divide in the community the referendum has created means that there is no mandate, democratic or otherwise, for a specific course of action or negotiation.

I ask you to consider how a consensus can be created for a course of action that has a demonstrable democratic mandate as parliament moves towards a decision on whether to make an Article 50 notification to the European Council.

Secondly, I ask you to consider the form of leadership we need as you consider your choice in electing a new leader of the Conservative Party. I will not offer a direct opinion as my own political bias clouds my view of many of your colleagues. I have been reminded recently of Nolan’s seven Principles of Public Life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership[4]. That these seem terribly old-fashioned, even naive, should be a concern. I am more than happy to work with those I disagree with, the best decisions come from arguing an issue out from multiple perspectives. But these qualities, qualities that underpin constructive discussion and resolution of difficult issues, have been notably missing from public life in recent weeks. We desperately need more than political gamesmanship to resolve these issues. We need leadership focussed on building consensus.

I ask you to consider in your choice of vote for leader of the parliamentary conservative party the qualities of leadership that will deliver consensus for the whole country, or failing that the courage to call a general election to deliver a democratic mandate for action.

And this brings me to my third point. Many people voted in this referendum for Leave for different reasons. Many of those reasons are deeply rooted in anger and disenfranchisement as a consequence of changes in the world. That areas with some of the most EU funding voted most strongly to leave, that the slogan of “take back control” resonated at so many different levels[5], that level of education so strongly correlated with voting intention[3], means we have a problem. Not a problem that can be dealt with by telling people they are wrong, or by explaining that the rising tide of the free market floats all boats, nor a problem that can be dealt with by simple leftist re-distribution. I can easily imagine being sick of being told that you’re wrong, failing to see this rising tide, and resenting being seen as a charity case (or indeed the political punching bag for a right vs left fight). We have a fractured society, in which our economic and political systems have failed to distribute the gains that immigration and globalization have created. The likely centrist fudge which will be made to resolve our current issues will completely fail to address the underlying issues that led to the referendum result. And we ignore those issues at our peril.

The country is split: whether North-South, over 50-under 50, city-rural, Labour voting-Tory voting, Remain-Leave. Those hard dichotomies are the result of two-party political system that is no longer fit for purpose, a polarised and politicised mass media, an increasing divide between rich and poor and between those with opportunities and those without, and are reinforced by the filter bubbles of social media (and the perhaps much greater bubble caused by the exclusion of the 25% of residents who’ve never used the internet). It is those hard splits, the binary decision making, more than any specific treaty or referendum that will kill us. The false choice of this or that; in or out, Labour or Tory, rather than finding new ways to reach consensus, to listen and understand the concerns of those who are disenfranchised. I don’t doubt that you and I would have different ideas about how to work to resolve those issues but that is a strength, not a weakness. Chances are we’re both wrong, but ideally in different and complementary ways.

And this is where I return to the point of hope. We may come from different political traditions. But we were on the same side of the referendum, arguing against many of our “natural” political allies. What this shows more than anything else is that there isn’t really a “natural” political landscape. The Punch and Judy, zero-sum game, in which there has to be a winning and losing side is something we need to be working towards consigning to the past. I don’t have any real answers on how, just a sense that we need to listen more the grievances that people have and work, somehow, towards a collective demonstrable consensus on what happens next.

Because if someone “wins” the argument over if and how we leave the EU then we will all have lost.

Yours truly,

Cameron Neylon

 

  1. https://twitter.com/gemmaklowe/status/747172162491023365/photo/1
  2. https://twitter.com/WillBrambley/status/747450027518398464
  3. http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why
  4. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life
  5. http://www.perc.org.uk/project_posts/thoughts-on-the-sociology-of-brexit/

NotAllBrexiters

I’ve been conflicted about posting this. I had planned to write something along these lines for several weeks but the murder of Jo Cox threw that sideways. The way I write tends to involve pushing words around in my head for a week or so, and then writing it all out. Thus most of this existed in some form prior to her murder but it was not written down. I don’t want to claim any prescience but those events, and the subsequent debate over their meaning, so reinforced the fears that led to this that I’ve decided to go ahead and post it.

I am an economic immigrant. And a British Citizen. I am culturally European, with primarily British ancestry, born in Australia. I never know how to answer the census question: am I non-white British as an Australian? I am unquestionably a member of this “metropolitan elite”. And I get irritated by the way Londoners forget the rest of the country exists. I am a mess of contradictions. Like most humans I guess.

And I’m frightened.

“Oh. But you’ll be OK”. Someone actually said this to me. I’m apparently not the problem, some unspecified “other” people are the problem. Other immigrants, with different accents, skin colours, or countries of origin. People I know. People I work with. I wonder which of them are on the wrong side of this invisible dividing line. This line I shouldn’t worry about because “oh, but you’re a good chap”.

We are far beyond the point where argument or “facts” will change anyone’s mind in this referendum. We are down the base level of what this was always about: identity politics. Arguments about regulation, or democracy are not really about the facts on the ground but a fight over whether “our” (desperately flawed) systems of elections, governance and regulation are better than “their” (desperately flawed) systems of negotiation, consensus building and, yes, democratic checks and balances.

It’s about how globalisation undermines some forms of identity, particularly those rooted in place, class, and traditional roles, and how it reinforces others, particularly those rooted in mobility, internationalism and some strands of social liberalism. And its about fear. Fear of the outsider. Fear of being the outsider. Fear of being on the wrong side of that line.

There are plenty of good solid arguments for Britain to leave the European Union. I know a number of people who genuinely find those arguments decisive. But the centre of the campaign to leave has been driven by the stoking of fear: fear of Turkey, fear of Syrians, Farage and his posters, and above all fear of a loss of control over a particular form of British, or at least English, identity.

And in turn those of us with a different identity – an identity often rooted in being an immigrant, or a traveller, or having students, colleagues or friends from many places – are also voting out of fear. A fear of where that line falls. Will we be tossed out? Some will. Will we be made to feel unwelcome? Many of us already do. And fear begets fear begets distrust begets anger begets violence.

I’m not writing this to tell anyone what to think or how to vote, or to accuse anyone of racism by association. I’m writing this to explain how I feel. And how I suspect many other immigrants, and children of immigrants, and friends and family of immigrants feel. The point of the title of this post is precisely that not that all those voting leave are driven by fear, but that virtually every person I know who is an immigrant or is close to immigrants is fearful. Not all Brexiters. Yes, pretty much, all immigrants.

Don’t ask me to be happy that I’m on the right side of that line. Because lines have a habit of moving.

Canaries in the Elsevier Mine: What to watch for at SSRN

English: Yellow canary
English: Yellow canary (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Just to declare various conflicts of interest: I regard Gregg Gordon, CEO of SSRN as a friend and have always been impressed at what he has achieved at SSRN. From the perspective of what is best for the services SSRN can offer to researchers, selling to Elsevier was a smart opportunity and probably the best of the options available given the need for investment. My concerns are at the ecosystem level. What does this mean for the system as a whole? 

 

 

The first two paragraphs of this post have been edited following its initial posting. The original version can be found at the bottom of the post.

The response to the sale of SSRN to Elsevier is following a pattern that will be very familiar to those who watched the sale of Mendeley a few years back. As I noted in my UKSG talk we face real communications problems in scholarly communication because different groups are concerned about very different things, and largely fail to understand those differences. These plays out in commentary that argues that “the other side” has “failed to understand” the “real issues” at stake, and mostly missing the issues that are at the centre of concerns for that “other side”.

To be clear, obviously I’m doing exactly the same thing in this post, it’s just that I’m pointing the finger at everyone and at a slightly higher level of abstraction. What I hope to do in this post is use one particular strand of the arguments being raised to illustrate how different stakeholders focus on quite different issues when they ask the question “is this purchase good or bad”. The real questions to ask are “what is it we care about” and “what difference does the purchase make to those aspects”. What we can do is look at this particular strand of the conversation and what it tells us about the risks, both for SSRN as a trusted repository for a range of research communities, and for the ecosystem as a whole.

The strand I’m interested in both illustrates the gaping divide between the narrative on both sides and also because it shows how quickly we forget history. But its useful because it also points us to some criteria for judgement. That strand goes like this: “Elsevier did a great job of supporting and looking after Mendeley [ed. as someone noted I originally had Elsevier here, arguably a Freudian slip…], so you can expect SSRN to be the same”. That’s a paraphrase rather than a direct quote but it captures the essence of a narrative that focuses on the idea that all the fears that arose when Elsevier purchased Mendeley turned out to be unfounded.

Except of course it depends which fears you mean. And that’s where the narrative gets interesting.

What were the fears for Mendeley’s future?

First the credit side. Elsevier invested massively in Mendeley, including a desperately needed top to bottom re-engineering of the code base. It’s not widely known just how shakey the Mendeley infrastructure was at the point of purchase, and without a massive capital investment from somewhere its questionable whether it could have stayed afloat. Elsevier have also maintained Mendeley as a free service for users – many assumed that it would convert to a fully paid model. The free for users offering sits alongside an institutional business offering, but that was already the primary focus of the team before the purchase. Indeed, again for full disclosure I, amongst I am sure many others, strongly recommended that Mendeley should shift its business focus from individual memberships to institutions long before the purchase.

Yes, there was a fear that Elsevier would just crush Mendeley, that it would go the way of many previous purchases, but at the very least that would never have been the intention, and many of those fears seem to have been unfounded.

Except that they weren’t the fears that at least some of us had. It’s actually telling that the narrative has legs because it shows how much of recent history has been forgotten. What has been largely forgotten that Mendeley was once positioned as a major and very public force in driving wider access. The description of Mendeley on the Elsevier Connect blog post about the SSRN purchase illustrates this:

As a start-up, Mendeley was focused on building its reference manager workflow tool, gaining a loyal following of users thankful that it made their lives easier. Mendeley continues to evolve from offering purely software and content to being a sophisticated social, informational and analytical tool.

SSRN—the leading social science and humanities repository and online community—joins Elsevier – Gregg Gordon

It’s not that this isn’t true. But it excises from history one of the significant strands of Mendeley’s early development. Compare and contrast that with this from Ricardo Vidal on the official Mendeley blog in 2010 (emphasis added):

Keeping with the Open Access week spirit, we’re taking this opportunity to show you how to publicly share your own research on Mendeley. Making it openly available for others to easily access means they are more likely to cite you in their own publications, and also allows your colleagues to build upon your work faster.

When you sign up for a Mendeley user account, a researcher profile is created for you. On this page, along with your name, academic status, and short bio, you will also see a section titled “Publications”. This section is where you can display work you’ve published or perhaps even work that’s not yet published.

Or this from William Gunn in 2012 (again emphasis added):

Requiring the published results of taxpayer-funded research to be posted on the Internet in human and machine readable form would provide access to patients and caregivers, students and their teachers, researchers, entrepreneurs, and other taxpayers who paid for the research. Expanding access would speed the research process and increase the return on our investment in scientific research.

We have a brief, critical window of opportunity to underscore our community’s strong commitment to expanding the NIH Public Access Policy across all U.S. Federal Science Agencies. The administration is currently considering which policy actions are priorities that will they will act on before the 2012 Presidential Election season swings into high gear later this summer. We need to ensure that Public Access is one of those priorities.

From 2008 when I met Victor Henning for the first time until 2013 Mendeley was a major, and very public, advocate for Public Access and Open Access. It was a big part of the sales pitch for the service and a big part of the drive to increase the user base, particularly amongst younger researchers. Mendeley provided a means for researchers to share their articles on a public profile and it did this in the context of a service that was useable and gaining traction. Alongside this it made a very public commitment to open data, being one of the first scholarly communications services to have a functional API providing data on bookmarks. It was the future of those activities that many of us feared in 2013 when the purchase went through. So how have they fared?

Has Mendeley thrived as an “open access” organisation?

Public sharing of articles is long gone. Long enough that many people have forgotten it ever existed. I can’t actually figure out exactly when this happened but it was around the time of the purchase. A chunk of a Scholarly Kitchen post on the sale is very sceptical of how this could be managed inside Elsevier. Now any public links on researcher profiles are to the publisher versions of the articles. Note that shift: an available version of a manuscript was removed from public view and replaced with a link to the publisher website (not augmented, not “offering the better version”, replaced). Certainly Mendeley does not provide any means of publicly sharing documents any more.

Has Mendeley retained an individual voice as an advocate of Public and Open Access? Well to be fair there is at least some evidence of independence. This from William Gunn on the STM/Elsevier policies on article sharing at least raises some things that Mendeley was not happy with. But more usual are posts that align with the overall Elsevier position. This on the UK Access to Research Program for instance is a straightforward articulation of the Publishers Association position (and completely at odds with those earlier positions above). A search for “open access” gives this post on “Myths of Open Access“, a rather muted re-hash of a much older BioMedCentral post. The next several hits are posts from before the purchase, followed by the Access to Research post. There is nothing wrong with this, priorities change, but Mendeley is no longer the place to go for full throated Open Access advocacy.

What about the API? As was noted of both the Mendeley and SSRN purchases it’s the data that really matters. The real diagnostic of whether Elsevier was committed to the same vision as the founders would have been strong support for the API and Open Data. Now, the API never went away, but nor was it exactly the priority for development resources. For those who used that data the reliability went steadily downhill from around 2013 onwards. What had once been the jewell in the crown of open usage data in scholarly communications was for periods basically un-usable. The priority was working with internal Elsevier data, building the vertical integration from Scopus through to Mendeley to support future products. Outside users (and therefore competitors) were a distant second. Things have improved significantly recently, a sign perhaps of investment priorities changing, but it is also coupled with some other troubling developments that indicate a desire to maintain control over information.

Within the STM/Elsevier Article Sharing Policy is an implication of a requirement for information tracking: “Publishers and libraries should be able to measure the amount and type of sharing, using standards such as COUNTER, to better understand the habits of their readers and quantify the value of the services they provide”. Read that next to this post on the LibLicense List on growing restrictions on the re-use of COUNTER data imposed by publishers. Then ask why there is a need for a private mechanism for pushing usage data, one that is intended to support the transport of “personally identifiable data about usage”? Business models where “you are the product” benefit from scale and enclosed data. Innovative and small scale market entrants benefit from an ecosystem of open data – closed data benefits large scale and vertically integrated companies, of which there is really only one example in the Scholarly Communications space (for the future watch SpringerNature and the inevitable re-integration of DigitalScience after the IPO but they’re not there yet).

If the argument for SSRN continuing successfully within Elsevier depends on the argument as to whether Mendeley has succeeded within Elsevier, then that argument depends entirely on what you mean by “succeeded”. Mendeley has changed: opinion will divide rather sharply between those who think that change is overwhelmingly good and those that think that change is overwhelmingly bad. About now, one group of readers (if they made it this far) will be exasperated with the “wooly” and “political” nature of the comments above. They will point to Mendeley “growing up” and “becoming serious”, properly integrated into a real business. Another group will be exasperated by the failure to criticise any and all commercial involvement, and the lack of commitment to the purity of the cause. If you fall into one of those camps then it tells me more about you, than it does about either Mendeley or SSRN. Far more interesting is the question of whether each element of that change is good, or bad, and for who, and at what level? Either way, the argument that “Mendeley thrived within Elsevier, therefore SSRN will” is certainly not a slam dunk.

What does this tell us about SSRN?

So what of the canaries? What does this tell us about what we should be watching for at SSRN? Certainly the purchase makes sense in the context of establishing stronger and broader data flows that can be converted to product for Elsevier. But what would be a sign that the service is drifting away from its original purpose? It’s those same three things. The elements that I have argued were lost after Mendeley was purchased.

  1. Advocacy: SSRN always occupied a quite different space in its disciplinary fields to that of Mendeley, and has never had a strong policy/advocacy stance. Nonetheless look for shifts in policy or narrative that align with the STM Article Sharing Policy or other policy initiatives driven from within Elsevier. Particularly in the light of recent developments with the Cancer Moonshot in the US look for efforts to use SSRN to show that “these disciplines are different to science/medicine”.
  2. Data: SSRN doesn’t have an API and access to data on usage is moderately restrictive already. One way for SSRN and Elsevier to prove me wrong is to make a covenant on releasing data or even better for them to build a truly open API. In the meantime watch for changes in terms of use on the pages that provides the rankings. When it is updated with the major site refresh that is almost certainly coming check for the tell tale signs of obfuscation to make it hard to scrape. These would be the signs of a gradual effort to lock down the data.
  3. Redirection: This is the big one. SSRN is a working paper repository. That is its central function. In that way it is different to Mendeley where you could always argue that the public access element was a secondary function. Watch very closely for when (not if) links to publisher versions of articles appear. Watch how those are presented and whether there is a move towards removing versions that might (perhaps) relate closely to a publisher version. Ask the question: is the fundamental purpose of this repository changing based on the way it directs the attention of users seeking content?

SSRN is a good service, and the Elsevier investment will improve it substantially. Whether the existing community of users will continue to trust and use it is an open question. I’ve heard more disquiet from real researchers beyond the twitter echo chamber than I would have expected but any reading of history suggests that it will lose some users but retain a substantial number. Service improvements offer the opportunity for future growth, although SSRN already has substantial market penetration, something that wasn’t true of Mendeley and its subsequent growth. It’s not clear to me that integration with the wider Elsevier ecosystem is something that user base wants, but improved interfaces and information flow to other systems certainly are. The real question is the extent to which Elsevier exerts control over information and user flows, and whether it uses that to foster competition or to control it.

Note on changes made post-publication: I have modified the initial paragraph because it was pointed out that it could be read as me being dismissive of the quality of arguments being made in other posts on the SSRN sale. That wasn’t my intent. What I had intended to say was that the different sides of those arguments build on quite separate narratives and world-views and that I had seen little evidence of real understanding of what the issues are across the stakeholder and cultural divides.  The original first paragraph is below.

The response to the sale of SSRN to Elsevier is pretty much entirely predictable. As I noted in my UKSG talk different groups are simply talking past each other, completely failing to understand what matters to the others, and for the most part failing to see the damage that some of that communication is doing. But that’s not what I want to cover here. What I’m interested is a particular strand of the conversation and what it tells us about the risks, both for SSRN as a trusted repository for a range of research communities, and for the ecosystem as a whole.

Scholarly Communications: Less of a market, more like general taxation?

English: Plot of top bracket from U.S. Federal...
Top bracket from U.S. Federal Marginal Income Tax (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

This is necessarily speculative and I can’t claim to have bottomed out all the potential issues with this framing. It therefore stands as one of the “thinking in progress” posts I promised earlier in the year. Nonetheless it does seem like an interesting framing to pursue an understanding of scholarly communications through.

The idea of “the market” in scholarly communications has rubbed me up the wrong way for a long time. Both the moral and political superiority claimed by private and commercial players for the presumption that markets should be unregulated and protected from “public interference” and the simplistic notion (acknowledging I’ve been guilty of doing this myself) of pointing to the market as “broken”.

A market, whether meant in the sense of a system of exchange that optimising complex pricing for a (set of) good(s) or in the political sense of a protected space for free private exchange, requires the ability for free exchange across that “market”. In it’s political sense it should also be somehow “organic” – that is it develops free from direct subsidy or indirect government control. None of these are true of the scholarly communications system: there is neither free exchange amongst providers, nor purchasers, there is as we shall see effectively compulsion on purchasers and providers, and the whole system only exists because of government subsidy.

Pointing to market failure isn’t helpful if there isn’t really a market. Nor is claiming that markets support better innovation and customer service. It’s poor politics but its also poor system analysis. If we want to make things better, we need a better framing that actually explains, and ideally predicts how changes might play out. After a conversation this morning I’m wondering whether general taxation is a better framing of the scholarly communications system.

Mancur Olson, in The Logic of Collective Action lays out the problem of how large groups can provision what he calls a “collective good”, today we would use the term “public good”. While he focusses on other examples he keeps the case of general taxation in the background. His conclusion is that large groups, which he describes as “latent”, need some form of compulsion to provide public goods. Buchannan, Ostrom and others would later work on the way in which smaller groups can successfully manage public-like goods that have some (differing) elements of private good-like natures. Buchannan focussed on “local public goods”, what we now call “toll goods” or “club goods“, which are non-rivalrous but excludable, Ostrom on “common pool resources” (CPRs) which are non-excludable but rivalrous. In both cases they diagnose limits on the scale of groups that can successfully manage these resources. Neither Ostrom nor Buchannan looked in great detail about the gradation from their ideal types (pure CPRs and club goods) as good become more public-like. We therefore need an economics of “public-making”.

The scholarly community (at least as currently configured) is far too large to provide public goods without compulsion or to manage CPRs or club goods. Yet research is about the generation of public goods (or at least public-like club goods). We therefore have a provisioning problem, and according to Olson one that requires compulsion to resource. We need tax.

That publishers provide a public-like good is easy to demonstrate for subscription articles. Once a PDF is created it is an almost pure public good in the wild. It can be distributed infinitely (non-rivalrous) and is almost impossible to stop (non-excludable). Equally the provision of metadata that is freely available for re-use is also a public good provision. The benefits of the review process are available to all who can access the article so that is also a public good. But herein lies a paradox. If these are public goods then classical economics tells us they won’t be provided by private enterprise. So what is going on?

One of Olson’s key insights is to separate the issue of public vs private (which is a vexed division in scholarly communications anyway) from systems that can impose the compulsion that provide public or collective goods. He notes for instance that in the early to mid-20th century workers in many US firms voted overwhelmingly in secret ballots to impose union membership on themselves and to create closed shops. Although we don’t get a vote on it, the world of academic publishing is not so different from the closed industrial shops of 50s America. If you don’t publish in the right places, you’re not part of the club. So there is a “tax” on the supply side, although the dues are paid in the effort of authorship (and refereeing) rather than as union membership fees. That compulsion is how knowledge as a club good is made more public-like.

But what about the demand side? What about the real money? Publishers are also providing a public good for institutions. It’s the system that matters from an institutional perspective, the exposure that their researchers get, the credit for publication and therefore “membership”. One journal more or less doesn’t really matter. Again the classical economics says there should be a substantial free rider problem with each library gradually cutting back on subscriptions to bring down expenditure (this argument has nothing to do with the serials crisis, it would still follow with a flat, or even dropping over all expenditure). In practice libraries don’t really have a choice about dealing with the Big 4 publishers and not that much choice about what they pay. Fees are configured so that there are only marginal savings in cutting the big deal and going a la carte. Indeed fees are based on a bizarre set of historical factors that have no real basis in reality. Effectively there is compulsion. It is more like tax than a market.

If the Big 4 are a bit like Federal income tax in the US system (yes, the analogy breaks down a bit there but there are multiple strands of national tax in some countries, such as “National Insurance” here in the UK) then the smaller publishers are a bit similar to US state income taxes. If you want you can move to a state with low or no tax, and you can equally have an institution that does no humanities, or no chemistry and avoid paying out to SAGE or the ACS, but those are not the regular choices, and they limit your opportunities to operate. Article Processing Charges are equivalent to a sales or consumption tax. The analogy works right down to the political argument about how consumption taxes can in principle reduce income tax evasion (or redistribute the burden of the scholcomms system back towards the biggest players) because even those who can afford good accountants (or in our case subscription negotiators) still consume goods (or publish articles), but often in practice also raise access barriers for the poor, particularly those seeking to raise their income above the local tax-free threshold.

The serials crisis is then the unconstrained rise in collective provisioning. Far from being a market response to demand, it is a self-reinforcing increase in provision that can’t possibly be subject to proper market discipline, because a market can never truly operate. I don’t need to spell out the political consequences of this argument, but I find it fascinating that we can frame the system as a European general taxation system run by organisations that espouse American fiscal politics. It certainly creates a moral equivalence between “private” provision of these public goods and collective provisioning, such as through repository systems. There really isn’t a difference. It’s simply a question of which form of provision is better suited and better value.

The economic consequences are that we cannot constrain costs through market oriented actions. The only way to constrain run away collective provisioning is through collective action. But collective action is hard because we operate in an existing collective system, with its existing mechanisms of compulsion. The evolution of systems that provide public goods is slow, compared to that of private goods (I am minded to compare manuscript submission systems with government websites as an example). Change will come locally, with local changes of rules. The local governments in the system, the scholarly societies, perhaps some institutions and University Presses, are where change can start, where there are small groups, those that Buchannan and Ostrom as well as Olson identify as able to act.

Ostrom in particular notes that very large scale management of common pool resources is possible within communities (and that privatisation and nationalisation both tend to fail) as long as institutions are built that can coordinate groups of groups. Federations of societies and groups of institutions alongside collective mechanisms like Open Library of Humanities and Knowledge Unlatched offer some possible directions, as does an interesting increase in the number of endowed journals being launched. Ostrom’s prescription is to build institutions that support communities working together effectively, so they can build these large collectives.

And the big governments? Well they can be changed or their orientation shifted from “big” to “small”. And if I recall correctly issues with taxation are often at the root of that change.

Open Access Progress: Anecdotes from close to home

nanoparticles
Solution extinction measurements of (A) faceted (B) and Au@MNPs and (C) photos of the particles. From Silva et al Chem. Commun., 2016 DOI:10.1039/C6CC03225G

It has become rather fashionable in some circles to decry the complain about the lack of progress on Open Access. Particularly to decry the apparent failure of UK policies to move things forward. I’ve been guilty of frustration at various stages in the past and one thing I’ve always found useful is thinking back to where things were. So with that in mind here’s an anecdote or two that suggests not just progress but a substantial shift in the underlying practice.

I live with a chemist, a group not known for their engagement with Open Access. More than most other disciplines in my experience there is a rigid hierarchy of journals, a mechanistic view of productivity, and – particularly in those areas not awash with pharmaceutical funding – not a huge amount of money. Combine that with a tendency to think everything is – or at least should be – patentable (which tends to rule out preprints) and this is not fertile ground for OA advocacy.

Over the years we’ve had our fair share of disagreements. A less than ideal wording on the local institutional mandate meant that archiving was off the menu for a while (the agreement to deposit required all staff to deposit but also required the depositor to take personal responsibility for any copyright breaches) and a lack of funds (and an institutional decision to concentrate RCUK funds and RSC vouchers on only the journals at the top of that rigid hierarchy) meant that OA publication in the journals of choice was not feasible either. That argument about whether you choose to pay an APC or buy reagents for the student was not a hypothetical in our household.

But over the past year things have shifted. A few weeks ago: “You know, I just realised my last two papers were published Open Access”. The systems and the funds are starting to work, are starting to reach even into those corners  of resistance, yes even into chemistry. Yes it’s still the natural sciences, and yes it’s only two articles out of who knows how many (I’m not the successful scientist in the house), buts its a quite substantial shift from it being out totally out of the question.

But around about the same time something that I found even more interesting. Glimpsed over a shoulder I saw something I found odd…searching on a publisher website, which is strange enough, and also searching only for Open Access content. A query raised the response: “Yeah, these CC BY articles is great, I can use the images directly in my lectures without having to worry; I just cite the article, which after all I would have obviously done anyway”. It turns out that with lecture video capture now becoming standard universities are getting steadily more worried about copyright. The Attribution licensed content meant there was no need to worry.

Sure these are just anecdotes but they’re indicative to me of a shift in the narrative. A shift from “this is expensive and irrelevant to me” to “the system takes care of it and I’m seeing benefits”. Of course we can complain that its costing too much, that much of the system is flakey at best and absent at worst, or that the world could be so much better. We can and should point to all the things that are sub-optimal. But just as the road may stretch out some distance ahead, and there may be roadblocks and barriers in front of us, there is also a long stretch of road behind, with the barriers cleared or overcome.

As much as anything it was the sense of “that’s just how things are now” that made me feel like real progress has been made. If that is spreading, even if slowly, then the shift towards a new normal may finally be underway.